Brave new world was emerging and chancing its face day by day with the advent of IOT, as a part of it we have IOV which may change the way we are driving our vehicles leading to Autonomous driving, As there is a lot of Buzz on these trends they also comes with security threats of different forms in which Sybil Attack is one in which a malicious vehicle may create multiple identities to a Real one, with which he may circumvent different forms of attacks, We proposed an approach in which we divide the vehicles in to different clusters with their location information and certificate and filter the Sybil nodes with an idea no two nodes with the same identities will have different location ID's or may fall in different clusters at the same time.
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of IOT and its real world applications creates a technological shift for costumers and as well as stakeholders. Intelligent Transportation System as an application of IOT helps shaping up the world of Driving with its numerous number of safety applications and making it smart which opens up the new area of Autonomous driving.
With the increasing number of connected cars brings up new set of Vulnerabilities in which Sybil Attack is one of its kind where a node behave like a legitimate one but creates numerous number of false identities which confuses the centralized authority to mistake the attacking node as a real node and vice-versa For V2V, V2I and V2X [17] communication in IOV need to provide cars identity to the other party in communication in the Figure 1 Car X provide identity Ix to RSU but prior Car Q provide its identity say IX instead of IQ, which makes RSU believe that Car Q's Identity is IX, the same way Q provide its identity IH instead of IQ under a different RSU and maintain communication and provide certain privileges of car X and car H which creates a serious problems like Car Y can device various attacks on others ultimately making Car X responsible for everything.
Figure 1. Sybil attack
It is very hard to identify a sible node in such a dynamic heterogeneous as the nodes are always mobile associating with different sets of nodes and as well as different RSU [18] , the main problem in identification of a sible node is to differentiate it to a legitimate node, Need to take multiple scenarios of the node and analyze its behavior and filter it out as one scenario may not lead to result. In our approach we devised an approach in which we create clusters of vehicles formed from location information, Certificate and filter out the attacker Node.
RELATED WORK
There is lot of work done to detect sybil attacks in WSN and VANET's but very less work done for detection of Sybil attacks in IOV in which certain solutions can be directly inferred from VANET's solutions which are classified in to three category's which includes detection based on certificate, detection based on position, and detection based on resource testing and all of these three and there are different solutions that falls under these mechanisms [15] [16] [17] have their own problems.
Xia Feng et al. [1] proposed an event based reputation system in which there is a trusted authority which issues and verifies certificates which are communicated by RSU and there is a event table in OBU which stores different events generated they generate reputation value and event value which incremented for every event occurrence and sybil nodes generates least no of events which can be detected and isolated.
JinTang et al. [2] proposed a solution called DMON, which is based on cryptographic ring signatures, and it replaces vehicle identities by their certificates that are generated using neighbor relationship of RSU. And the Sybil node may not characterize the to have the neighbor relationship of RSU and can be detected by filtering out signatures from certificate.
YunchuanSun et al. [3] have classified Sybil attack as one of the attacks on authentication in which they had not proposed any pin punted mechanism but given its countermeasures in form of Threat models, Intrusion detection system and key management .
Chea et al. [4] have proposed a distributed detection based solution in which anode is detected as Sybil if it is passive in data eet alxchange even the node is in between two other communicating nodes and there will be a voting of Sybil node from the neighborhood information that is collected periodically.
Yuan Yao et al. [ 5] have proposed a detection mechanism which is based on Received Signal strength Indicator in which each node independently generates a message containing RSSI time series called vascular speech and all of its neighbors exchange such messages and the similarity in the messages are compared between them to filter Sybil node , it does not need any centralized infrastructure for detection.
PengwenlongGu et al. [7] have proposed a solution detection mechanism based on Vehicle driving pattern in which for every vehicle they create a matrix based of driving pattern which is generated by beacon messages they used to exchange, and these matrix are compared with the actual pattern and if an unusual behavior is taken as a Sybil node.
Khaled Rabieh [6] have proposed a solution to detect Sybil vehicles based on their locations in which each of the vehicle is sent challenge and it has to respond with its location as the sybil node most likely to send false data it can be detected using some comparisons, as the challenges can note be sent all the times which creates a lot of overhead, these packets are sent in case of suspicion for Sybil attack.
Many other [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] have taken Sybil attack detection with different approaches but every one of them have their own pros and cons resulting no standard way of detection.
SYSTEM MODEL
The system model can be described as IOV connects the cars to infrastructure, with the help of cars Onboard Unit (OBU) which is equipped with different integrated technologies like DSRC, GPS, LADER, Optical camera's and various sensors [22] which work independently or together to generate data of the vehicles. The data generated by the vehicles are sent to Road Side Units (RSU) [18] using 4G or existing DSRC [29] , These RSUs are connected with other RSU to form a network [12] , which takes care of the Handover and Vehicles can communicate with one another using DSRC, which falls in their range.
Every vehicle is holding an unique identity IDV [13] which is given by the manufacturer and registered under government and also it holds a certificate CV which is holding IDV and different parameters of the vehicle which is signed by a global authority. Figure 2 depicts vehicle V enters an RSU coverage from another RSU it must submit its certificate CV to RSU and RSU validates it by checking it over the revocation lists and it handovers a temporary certificate TCV so that the vehicle can communicate with other vehicles using TCV under a RSU coverage [20] 
Communication model
and these temporary certificates may expire soon after the vehicle enters another RSU leaving from current RSU. All the RSUs are interconnected with one another and they do all the necessary knowledge sharing and handover.
Threat model
To undergo a Sybil attack the attacking nodes must possess different sets of valid certificates, which may be acquired while capturing, or spoofing from the real vehicles while they handshake with RSU and use these fake identities to get the required TCV form RSU and act and communicate like a legitimate vehicles and they at a given moment of time they may be registered under different RSUs with different TCVs.From the set of vehicles, few of them may form as attacking nodes covered under different RSUs can send false information to nearby vehicles and RSU it sends multiple false locations at a given period of time.
PROPOSED WORK
Every vehicle sends location information to RSU in regular intervals of time Here we use K Means Clustering algorithm [24] [25] [26] [27] to form Vehicular clusters under each RSU which leads in different vehicular clusters. Due to the dynamic nature of the vehicles the clusters may change dynamically which ultimately results in the formation of new clusters with the location change [22] .
Algorithm
Step 1 :Apply K-Means Using location data run K-Means clustering algorithm for n vehicles under RSU, which forms clusters Step 2: Means are calculated for each cluster
Step 3: Repeat steps 1 and 2 every 0.5 to 2 sec which results in new set of Means and record them Step 4: Suspicious node detection If two consecutive Mean variation is more than specified threshold
Read the nodes that caused the variation into a set of suspicious nodes Step 5: understand the behavior For every node in set of set of suspicious nodes If speed variation is much high or if the node had an angular change Remove it from suspicious node set Step 6: Filtering out the Sybil nodes Take the subset of suspicious node set created under different RSUs under a region If the nodes having same identities under different cluster identities Then the resultant nodes are Sybil nodes
Apply k-means
Under an RSUA a set of n vehicles sends location data say L1, L2, L3… Ln, and under RSUB a set of m vehicles sends location data say L1, L2, L3… Lm which are obtained from OBU of the vehicles, Each RSU may locally or remotely runs K-Means algorithm which ultimately forms clusters C1, C2…Ck
For each cluster Ci calculate mean using K-Means algorithm which results in mean M and do it independently for each cluster M= K-Means (L1, L2, L3… Ln) For every 0.5 to 2 sec we calculate new Means for the new location data as the locations for each vehicle changes periodically which results in new set of means Mt1, Mt2... Mts of the clusters
Suspicious node detection:
Once after getting Mt1, Mt2... Mtscalculate the mean variation, which can be drawn from the difference in two consecutive means δM1 = Mt2 -Mt1 δM2 = Mt3 -Mt2 δMs = Mts -Mts-1 Let λ be the Mean Variation Threshold which can be driven from the previous outcomes, type of the road, speed limitation of the vehicles, line diversions etc. we can set the λ value keeping all these factors combined or individually for example if the road is not having any diversions then it may have average λ value, but if the roads are narrow, having diversions then λ can take high values it also varies with the vehicle density Once the threshold is fixed then it is compared against the mean change if the mean change is greater than the threshold that is if δM1>λ,M2>λ … then identify the nodes which caused the variation in to a set called suspicious nodes set.
Understanding the behavior of suspicious nodes
Once the suspicious nodes are detected then understand their behavior, if the mean variation of the vehicle is due to sudden acceleration which can be directly taken or derived from the speed change over the time periods or if the vehicle is leading to an angular change which can be derived from change in its location then such kind of vehicles are the processing general behavior can be withdrawn from the suspicious set.
Filtering out the sybil nodes
Same way RSUA and RSUB prepare their own suspicious sets they are compared with one another and also with the global set under a region common nodes are filtered out. These node identities are taken along with their cluster identities from which we can figure out Sybil nodes as they possess same identities under different clusters. 
SIMULATION RESULTS
We have simulated our detection mechanism using OMNET++ having Veins extension and the vehicles are simulated using SUMO [19] with 100 cars having 2 RSUs forming 4 clusters with a single diversion in path and with the mean variation threshold λ= 15, K-Means algorithm is called every 0.5 sec, we have assigned 20 Sybil nodes with for every 5 nodes processing same temporary certificates TCV. The simulation is carried for 10 sec in which our mechanism able to identify the Sybil nodes, as shown in the graph and we have successfully taken the results for different λ values in different traffic scenarios which leads a good detection rates and as shown in Figure 4 the Sybil nodes are shown in red color have been properly identified from legitimate nodes.
We have compared our simulation results with different set of nodes and observed the detection rate and compared it to other existing implementations like certificate based, resource testing based. As shown in Figure 4 our mechanism gave a very good results with a good rate of detection and the result doesn't get much effected as the number of Sybil nodes increased.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
With new ways to communicate and drive will come with new challenges, Our work deals with detection of Sybil Vehicles considering road safety application in which we have given an Algorithm which uses K-Means algorithm for clustering out the nodes and dynamic filtering of Sybil nodes using behavioral understanding of the vehicles.
We end up with a good results in detecting Sybil nodes without compromising Delay in communication, our work also opens doors to Pure IOV based communication and detection using Global infrastructure without relying on RSU as we use RSU as a key player in our work.
